Session 1 Abstracts

Titel og manchet til Peter Wolsings oplæg ved Dansk Filosofisk Selskabs årsmøde 2019:

Titel: “Beobachtende Vernunft”. Om Hegels ‘naturfilosofi’ i Phänomenologie des Geistes belyst ud fra striden om differens i den tidlige tyske idealismes identitetsfilosofi.

 

Manchet: Hegels såkaldte Differensskrift (1801) er traditionelt blevet opfattet som en åben støtte til Schellings forsøg på at konstruere en naturfilosofi som komplement til den Fichteske transcendentalfilosofi. ’Identitet’ er udtrykket for den enhed af disse to delsystemer, som det filosofiske system, som tiden efter Kant er optaget af at udvikle, skal udgøre. Som bekendt præsenterer Hegel sit bud på et filosofisk system i Encyklopædien (1817) men med en helt anden begrebsramme end forgængernes. Imidlertid overses det ofte, at allerede Differensskriftet rummer en ansats til et alternativ til Schellings forsøg på at ’tackle’ den naturfilosofiske differens. I oplægget forsøges det påvist, at Hegel udvikler dette alternativ allerede i den naturfilosofiske del af Phänomenologie des Geistes: Kapitlet ”Beobachtende Vernunft: Beobachtung der Natur” omhandler Hegels kritiske tilegnelse af Schellings og samtidens naturfilosofi i øvrigt, og det skal forstås som et forsøg på at løse identitetsfilosofiens problem med den fortrængte differens: naturen.

 


 

Titel og manchet til Peter Wolsings oplæg ved Dansk Filosofisk Selskabs årsmøde 2019:
Titel: “Beobachtende Vernunft”. Om Hegels ‘naturfilosofi’ i Phänomenologie des Geistes belyst ud fra striden om differens i den tidlige tyske idealismes identitetsfilosofi.

 

Manchet: Hegels såkaldte Differensskrift (1801) er traditionelt blevet opfattet som en åben støtte til Schellings forsøg på at konstruere en naturfilosofi som komplement til den Fichteske transcendentalfilosofi. ’Identitet’ er udtrykket for den enhed af disse to delsystemer, som det filosofiske system, som tiden efter Kant er optaget af at udvikle, skal udgøre. Som bekendt præsenterer Hegel sit bud på et filosofisk system i Encyklopædien (1817) men med en helt anden begrebsramme end forgængernes. Imidlertid overses det ofte, at allerede Differensskriftet rummer en ansats til et alternativ til Schellings forsøg på at ’tackle’ den naturfilosofiske differens.

 

I oplægget forsøges det påvist, at Hegel udvikler dette alternativ allerede i den naturfilosofiske del af Phänomenologie des Geistes: Kapitlet ”Beobachtende Vernunft: Beobachtung der Natur” omhandler Hegels kritiske tilegnelse af Schellings og samtidens naturfilosofi i øvrigt, og det skal forstås som et forsøg på at løse identitetsfilosofiens problem med den fortrængte differens: naturen.

 


 

 

Kirsten Klercke

 

SPLITTELSE SOM SUBJEKTIVITETENS FORUDSÆTNING - om Hegel og især Kierkegaard

 

Subjektet forstået som selvforhold, som refleksion er for Kierkegaard underlagt dialektik.
Subjektet kan for ham hverken via erkendelse – selvrefleksion – eller vilje umiddelbart opnå selvoverensstemmelse eller identitet uden at inddrage differens. Det menneskelige selv er i sig selv splittet, oscillerende mellem subjekt- og objektpositioner.
Kierkegaards angivelige psykologi er hér afgørende influeret af den tyske idealismes problemfelt og begrebsapparat, ikke mindst Hegels. Kierkegaards kritik af Hegels Aufhebung (’mediation’) er en potensering af det dialektiske: som paradoks. Eller som åbne modsætningsopstillinger uden mellemled. F.eks udtrykt som en chiasme, ikke helt ulig den sene Merleau-Ponty. Han afviser som Hegel umiddelbare, entydige definitioner, der fastslår subjektets identitet/essens - og objektiverer det. Entydighed forstærker netop splittelsens lidelse, fikserer tvetydighed som uopløselig ambivalens, tvesind. Man må gennemleve splittelsen, så at sige, f.eks. i angst og fortvivlelse.


De menneskelige lidenskaber, følelsesregistret i sin helhed, må analyseres i deres dialektiske omslag: Beundring kan blive misundelse, nydelse fortvivlelse, kærlighed had, passivitet aktivitet og omvendt. SKs eksistentialisering af denne dialektik kan forenes med (især Lacaniansk) psykoanalyse. Den må derimod ses som kritisk modspil til aktuelle psykologiske retninger, f.eks. positiv psykologi og kognitiv terapi, der fungerer anderledes ’umiddelbart’.

 


 

Sune Lægaard

Emne: Equality of opportunity and religion

 

Abstract: Equality of opportunity is a popular ideal, both when we assess access to specific goods such as jobs, education and health, and as a more general principle of distributive justice. The paper considers equality of opportunity in relation to religion. What are the possible relations between equality of opportunity as a general ideal and religion? The paper further provides an overview of existing discussion on equality of opportunity and religion. Many of these discussions have proceeded under the heading of multiculturalism, where minority religious practices have often been the focus of debate, e.g. in discussion of religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.

The paper focuses on the underlying conceptions of equality of opportunity involved in such debates, provides an overview of the most prominent types of arguments and analyses how they view religion as relevant to ideals of equality of opportunity.

 


 

 

Democratic participation and the digital divide: Access, use or effects? Andreas Albertsen, Aarhus University.

 

It is widely accepted that political participation is part of a functioning democracy and lack of participation, especially if differentiated by class, race or other socially salient factors, is a course for concern. Declining and unequal political participation has prompted efforts to reignite democratic participation. Some such efforts are connected to technological development.

In the empirical literature, we can identify two proposals for how technological development and the diffusion of technology may change patterns of participation. A) is that new technology may change old patterns of voting, mobilizing those who currently abstain. B) is that technology may offer new forms of participation. Essentially, that online petition, message boards, facebook groups, micro-donations online, etc. will result in the participation of those, who traditionally did not vote or otherwise engage with democratic participation. Such hopes are often dented by the unequal diffusion of new technologies (Norris 2001; Schlozman, Brady, and Verba 2018).

 

There are two competing hypotheses’ applicable to both these ways in which the development of new technology may affect various forms of participation. One is the normalization hypothesis, which holds that new technologies reproduce or even increases existing technologies. The other is the mobilization hypothesis which holds that new technologies may mobilize new groups to participate(Hirzalla, Van Zoonen, and de Ridder 2010). The literature over technological diffusion and democratic participation lacks coherent and developed criteria for when the unequal distribution of various participation-enhancing technologies are problematic. All too often the literature proceeds from the unfounded assumption that distribution of access is what matters.

This article proposes that we evaluate diffusion by employing a framework which has four core elements. The section employs the internet use as an illustrative example

 

The first element prompts us to evaluate how the technology is and can be used. As many technologies have multiple uses, we must first distinguish which uses are important from the perspective of democratic participation. Clearly, not every use of the internet is important to democratic participation. The second element prompts us consider whether we care about this specific use in itself or only an effect of this. This offers us an important difference between A and B above. When technology offers new forms of participation, using those is what is important rather than the effects of this use. The third element pertains to distributions. While the literature often focusses on distributions of access, it follows from the above that we should care about the distribution use and/or of relevant effects. It follows from this that we may prefer an unequal distribution of a technology to an equal one (and indeed, an unrepresentative distribution to a representative) if the inequality counteracts existing inequalities. The framework thus gives us reason to prefer that the young uses the internet more than the old to collect information if the young are less likely to vote in elections. The paper then applies the framework on the popular voting advice applications.

 


 

Compulsory voting and the voluntariness of electoral abstention

Jens Damgaard Thaysen, Postdoc.
Department of Learning and Philosophy, AAU

 

Abstract: Proponents of compulsory voting sometimes assert that many acts of electoral abstention in voluntary voting democracies are, to some extent, involuntary, and that this supports the case for compulsory voting in two ways. First, it strengthens the case for compulsory voting by indicating that compulsory voting is necessary to ensure that de facto universal franchise. Second, it weakens the case against compulsory voting by undermining claims that compulsory voting infringes on the negative liberty of abstainers. This talk argues that appeals to the involuntariness of abstention under voluntary voting cannot bolster the case for compulsory voting in either of these ways.

 

It does so by defending the two following claims. A) the involuntariness of many acts of electoral abstention under voluntary voting support the case for compulsory voting only if most involuntary abstainers under voluntary voting would be responsible for abstaining under compulsory voting. B) It is not the case that most involuntary abstainers under voluntary voting would be responsible for abstaining under compulsory voting.

 


 

Against Comfort: Political and Social Implications of Evading Discomfort

Ditte Marie Munch-Jurisic, postdoc, Philosophy and Science Studies, RUC

 

In this paper, I focus on covert forms of feelings and affects, the so-called gut feelings, and the way they shape and influence political life. More specifically, I focus on feelings of comfort and discomfort to consider how trust of such gut feelings can be an obstacle for social and political progress. We typically think of feelings of discomfort and comfort as highly individual and personal and absent of political content. But if a person with an immigrant background feels nervous and uncomfortable at a job interview, we have only given half of the story, if we say that his nervousness is due to his individual psychology. It is well-established that it is simply easier to interact with people who resemble us (in terms of, for example, ethnicity, gender, social and economic class).

 

They increase our visceral well-being and make us more comfortable. Emotional synchronizing and empathizing become easier when we share the same experiences or cultural background (Barrett, Bloom).


The consequence—that most of us evade discomfort and favor the comfortable, often in unconscious and implicit ways—is a problem not only for the individual, but also for the possibilities of social and political change in a given society. Research, for example, has established how in-group favoritism and helping behavior in the US contribute to subtle forms of discrimination (Banaji and Greenwald). Visceral gut-feelings are not merely a product of one’s own individual psyche but co-constituted by the social and political context (Sullivan). Moreover, and importantly, the possibilities for political and social change are dependent on the way an individual interprets and manages his affective states. If we want a more equal and unbiased society, we need to be willing to expose ourselves to more discomfort both by choosing to do things (and to be in environments) that we find uncomfortable.

 


 

Helene Scott-Fordsmand, PhD Stipendiat, KU

When Materiality Misbehaves – the abject and the scientific body in medicine

 

Under the session headline Gut Feelings, this paper departs from the Kristevean notion of abjection (Kristeva 1982), as a term for uncanny materialities that generate a ‘deep-gutted’ desire to repulse. In the paper I use the notion in an attempt to cast new light on the role of the material bodies and bodily elements in medical science.
Stereotypical examples of phenomena encountered as abject include the human corpse, as well as a variety of bodily waste: faeces, menstrual blood, saliva, pus etc.; a group of materialities that is strangely compatible with the phenomena at play in medical practice and research. Despite this compatibility, repulsion is not the expected reaction from the doctor, when we expose our infected wounds or describe the colour and consistency of our faeces upon request in the medical consultation. In other words, phenomena that often hold an unsettling and sometimes horrifying power seem to have been neutralized or at least temporarily muted within the medical setting. Why is that? And how does it happen?

 

Using the notions of order/dis-order as connected to the activities of the scientific and the abject respectively, I examine the oppositions, breaking-points and relations between the scientific and the abject body. Asking question such as: what role does the corpse play in the medical science, and how does its potential abject power affect this role, if it does?
The paper is meant as a preliminary reflection to set the scene for further discussion. It presents introductory thoughts and questions that prelude further investigations, both theoretical and empirical.

 


 

Adam Bencard

Giving a shit – on fecal transplants and ordinary affects

 

Around 2005, some researchers began speaking of a forgotten organ in the human body. The organ, surprisingly, was not, strictly speaking, human; rather it was the trillions of microorganisms – bacteria, fungi, viruses, archea and more – that populates our intestines, amounting to around 2 kilograms of biomass. The flora has a collective metabolic activity equal to a virtual organ within an organ, and the influence of this inner microbial ecosystem on key aspects of our everyday lives and wellbeing, ranging from metabolism and immune system responses, to moods and mental health, is currently the objects of intense scientific scrutiny.

 

Part of the scientific interest and experimentation concerns the transplantation of this organ; a procedure known as Fecal Matter Transplant (FMT). FMT is the process of taking feces from a healthy donor and transplanting either rectally or orally (in specialized capsules) to the colon of the patient. The procedure is used clinically to treat recurrent infections with the antibiotic resistant bacteria Clostridium Difficile, an infection which gives chronic diarrhea and kills many thousand patients annually across Europe and the US. Alongside this clinical application, numerous trials are currently underway investigating the possibility of using FMT for many of the health issues mentioned above. Results are still unsettled and preliminary. But instead of waiting for the science of FMT to be settled and proper clinical guidelines to be issued, patients have begun experimenting with DIY FMT procedures, and there are scores of guides, videos and testimonies online.

 

This paper examines this DIY culture around FMT. It draws inspiration from writings on affect and worlding, including the work on ordinary affects by Kathleen Stewart, Thomas Dumm’s writing on the politics of the ordinary, and Laurent Berlant’s tracing of affective and aesthetic responses to shifts in the life world. The paper will draw on online material, including testimonials, online diaries, patient reports, videos, and more, in order to contribute to the elucidation of how feces and the gut microbiota is important to everyday experiences and disciplinings of embodiment and sociality, to our hierarchical relations with human and nonhuman others. Ultimately, its aim is to examine what the experiences of DIY FMTs might tell us of how people are attempting to integrate nonhuman microbes into their sense of self and their lifeworld.

 


 

Abstract: Stemninger og håndtering af velbefindende
Af Søren Engelsen

 

En fyldestgørende undersøgelse af lykke og wellbeing må inddrage følelseslivet, herunder ikke mindst stemninger. I dette oplæg præsenterer jeg en fænomenologisk analyse af stemningers betydning for velbefindende og mulighederne for at drage omsorg for andre gennem stemningsregulering. Jeg argumenterer for, at stemninger og stemningsregulering har grundlæggende betydning for velbefindende, og jeg forsøger at illustrere hvordan. Et væsentligt aspekt af at befinde sig vel i verden er at være vel ’afstemt’ med sine omgivelser, og stemninger bidrager til at åbne og lukke sindet for bestemte værdikvaliteter og muligheder. Denne indsigt kan vi udnytte i omsorgsarbejde.

Vi kan rekonstruere forskellige former for stemnings-regulering, der kan bidrage til at drage omsorg for andre. Eftersom personers stemninger og deres omverdenserfaring er uløseligt sammenhængende, er forskellige former for situationskontrol særligt afgørende, og omsorgen for andre kan kvalificeres ved at have blik for disse. Analysen anskueliggøres med eksempler fra kvalitative empiriske undersøgelser af ældres velbefindende.

 


 

Abstract: Operationalisering af Heideggers begreb ”Idle talk”
Af Jakob Emiliussen

 

Operationaliseringen of nøglebegreber fra den fænomenologiske tradition er et vigtigt skridt når man forsøger at bruge disse begreber i empirisk forskning. ”Idle talk” (Das Gerede) har hidtil være noget der blev bortfiltreret i empirisk fænomenologisk forskning da det bliver betragtet som noget der obskurere det centrale fænomen for undersøgelsen. I dette oplæg fremlægges en art ”omvendt fænomenologi” som skal udforske de lingvistiske faktorer og konceptuelle strukturer som konditionere fænomener, i stedet for at bortfiltrere dem. Det Heidgger kalder ”idle talk” er en særlig relevant konditionerende faktor, både på grund af begrebets allestedsnærværelse og på grund af dens forholdsvis tydelige og konkrete manifestationer. Der vil blive givet et konkret bud på operationaliseringen af idle talk for empirisk videnskab.

 


 

 

Søren Harnow Klausen: The Many Faces of Hedonic Adaptation

 

The phenomenon known as hedonic adaptation – that people tend to adapt to new, negative or positive, conditions, and so to revert to their prior level of happiness – has played an important, but complex role in recent ethics and political philosophy. It has been seen as demonstrating the futility of attempts to improve living conditions, but also used to criticize life satisfaction surveys and the subjectivist understanding of wellbeing on which they are based.

I argue, based on both theoretical considerations and observations and interviews with elderly care residents, that a number of different kinds of hedonic adaptation, with different normative significance, should be distinguished. I specifically argue that adaptation is best understood from the perspective of a procedural approach to wellbeing, and consider ways – and the extent to which – adaptation can be used to improve or maintain wellbeing of individuals.

 


 

 

Title: Didactic reflections on the use of Audience Response Systems in courses within theoretical philosophy
Nikolaj Nottelmann

 

Abstract: Since the 1990ies, very many studies have documented the positive learning effects of appropriate uses of Audience Response Systems such as PollEverywhere and Shakespeak within university teaching. However, the vast majority of those studies have focused on the natural sciences and medicine. While few studies concern the social sciences, less than a handful specifically concern the humanities. This appears to be merely a historical oversight, due to the fact that the effective use of ARS originated in physics and spread from there. As i shall argue in this talk, there is no obvious reason to suspect that didactically the use of ARS will be less relevant to courses in the humanities.

 

Recently, Sam Buchart has reported very good results from a grand project with integrating ARS in a variety of courses within the philosophy program at Monash University. Building from the work of Buchart and his colleges and integrating my own practical experiences, I make the case that ARS could also improve the learning experience and enhance learning results in practically all types of courses within Danish philosophy programs.

 


 

 

Michael May, IDK, SDU Kolding
Virtual and hands-on laboratory exercises in biochemistry education: didactic and epistemic aspects

 

This talk has a triple focus on (1) use cases for virtual laboratory exercises, (2) conceptual issues in what constitutes "virtual laboratories", and (3) epistemic issues of what to expect from learning through simulations. The Labster virtual lab provides a simulated 3D environment for interacting with case-based exercises in the biosciences. A case in enzyme kinetics provides an opportunity to practice procedures in reaction rate experiments.
Ad (1) There are 3 use cases for virtual exercises: (a) as a supplement to lectures & textbooks, i.e. as a theoretical supplement, (b) as a supplement to lab instructions, i.e. as preparation for later hands-on exercises, and (c) as a substitute for hands-on exercises. The VR case provided an overview of the lab procedures, whereas the actual interaction within the VR world did not transfer well to the hands-on lab.
Ad (2) Exploring "virtual labs" in bioscience uncovered a conceptual confusion concerning what "counts" as a virtual lab. An analysis of differential features (animation, simulation, multimedia, gameplay and VR) of virtual labs using Formal Concept Analysis show how different combinations account for different virtual laboratory environments.
Ad (3) Epistemic issues arise from student learning through simulated exercises. Fundamentally simulations provide opportunities for parameter simulation not available in hands-on experiments, but on the other hand the “resistance” of the world to experimental hypotheses and the possibility of failure is reduced in virtual experiments. Teachers and students are limited by pre-programmed exercises. Animations and simulations can lead to a false sense of understanding and an illusory conception of reality (e.g. how molecules "really looks like"). These limitations are seldom considered in the excitement over learning with digital media and VR. The subjective experience of understanding and the "reality effect" of virtual reality needs to be challenged through the "resistance" of hands-on experiments and through the "resistance" in social negotiation of conflicting interpretations and perspectives.

 

May, M., Skriver, K. & Dandanell, G. (2013). Technical and didactic problems of virtual lab exercises in biochemistry and biotechnology education. Proceedings of SEFI Annual Conference in Engineering Education, KU Leuven.
Kuorikoski, J. (2011) Simulation and the Sense of Understanding. In: Humphreys, P. & Imbert, C. (Eds): Models, Simulations, and Representations. New York, Routledge.

 


 

 

Tacit knowledge aspects of learning with ICT
Nina Bonderup Dohn, professor, dr.phil., Department of Design and Communication, SDU

 

I start this talk by shortly presenting my view of knowledge as an embodied, action-oriented perspective on the situation, consisting of a holistic unity of the three non-reducible but interrelated aspects: propositional knowledge, practical knowledge, and experiential knowledge. Inspiration for my view comes in particular from Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, and Dreyfus as well as from empirical research within learning theory, especially situated learning and distributed cognition. Given this view, I consider what tacit knowledge aspects are at play in ICT-mediated learning.

 

Answering this question requires the distinction of several different forms of ICT-mediated learning, e.g. skills training programs; linguistically based discussion fora; simulation programs; construction programs; scripted inquiry; eXtended Reality. At a general level, some tacit knowledge aspects concerning tool use and the significance of experience cut across these different forms. Differences apply as concerns the more specific roles which embodiment and experiential knowledge play, depending also on the kind of content to be learned. I end by asking whether my view of tacit knowledge poses challenges on ICT-mediated learning, at least in terms of delimiting how ICT can (not) fruitfully be utilized for learning.